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FIFRA AND THE "TAKING" OF TRADE SECRETS 
Joseph F. Gannon * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pesticide industry is big business in this country. 
Thousands of companies are engaged in some level or another of 
the production and marketing of pesticides.1 Over 1.4 billion 
pounds of pesticides are produced each year with some 1,400 ac-
tive ingredients formulated into approximately 40,000 end-use 
products. II Total sales of pesticides can amount to billions of dol-
lars a year.s With 'so many participants and with so much at 
stake, competition is stiff. The value of information which would 
allow one company to get a competitive leg-up on another is quite 
high. To the extent they can, companies naturally prefer to main-
tain as trade secrets any data which they develop." 
* Staff member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
1 S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 28, 34 (1977). 
• [d. at 34. 
• 43 Fed. Reg. 17,781 (1978) (supplementary information to final regulations limiting 
effluent discharges by manufacturers of certain chemicals). Sales of pesticide chemicals in 
1975, for example, were over $2.16 billions at manufacturers' value. [d. 
• See, Memorandum of Plaintiffs' in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 
14-16, Amchem Products Co. v. Costle, Civ. No. 76-2913 (S.D. N.Y. , filed July 9, 1979). 
[hereinafter cited as Amchem Memo.] One of the most commonly accepted definitions of 
trade secrets is that found in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757, Comment b (1939): 
Definition of trade secret. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device 
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an 
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may 
be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserv-
ing materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. It differs 
from other secret information in a business ... in that it is not simply information as 
to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business, as, for example, the 
amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain employees, 
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Since the passage of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act (FIFRA) in 1947,11 the federal government, through 
its power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Con-
stitution,6 has required pesticide manufacturers wishing to mar-
ket a pesticide to submit data demonstrating the pesticide's 
safety and efficacy to a regulatory agency for its approval, before 
the agency "registers" the product and allows it to be marketed,7 
FIFRA contained no provision for the protection of trade secrets 
until 1972,8 However, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), the present administrator of FIFRA, and its predecessor 
or the security investments made or contemplated, or the date fixed for the announce-
ment of a new policy or for bringing out a new model or the like. A trade secret is a 
process or device for continous use in the operation of the business. Generally it relates 
to the production of goods, as, for example, a machine or formula for the production of 
an article. It may, however, relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the 
business, such as a code for determining discounts, rebates or other concessions in a 
price list or catalogue, or a list of specialized customers, or a method of bookkeeping or 
other office management. 
Patents may be issued to cover a newly-discovered chemical, a newly-discovered use for 
a known chemical, or a new method for producing a chemical. Normally, producers of 
pesticides make prompt application for patents in order to protE'ct their discoveries from 
loss through publication or independent discovery by another. During the seventeen year 
period of patent protection the producer has the exclusive right to manufacture and mar-
ket the product but may license others to do so. Once the protection period expires, how-
ever, anyone may duplicate the invention and market it without permission of the inven-
tor. S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, 37 (1977). Data generated during the 
production and testing of a pesticide is not patentable, however. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 
(patent laws). Anyone who obtained such data not protected as trade secrets would be free 
to use that data. Producers try to maintain the data as trade secrets because it allows 
them to prevent use or disclosure of the data by those to whom the secret has been con-
fided or by those who have obtained the secret by improper means, such as theft or wire-
tapping. Trade secret protection does not prevent the use of data which is independently 
generated or otherwise legitimately obtained and so is a lesser form of protection than the 
exclusive rights for seventeen years granted by patents. However, trade secret protection 
may last indefinitely so long as the information is kept secret. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (holding that state trade secret laws do not conflict with 
federal patent laws); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757 (1939). 
• Act of June 25, 1947, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (current version at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y 
(West Supp. 1979)). 
• "The Congress shall have Power ... (t)o regulate commerce with foreign nations and 
among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
7 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a. (West Supp. 1979) See text at notes 18-69, infra, for a fuller discus-
sion of FIFRA. Normally a patent for a pesticide issues well before the producer has devel-
oped data establishing the pesticide's safety and efficacy for registration purposes. See 
note 2, supra. There may be only 12 or so years of patent protection remaining when a 
product is initially registered under FIFRA. S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 
(1977). Thus, the importance of maintaining the secrecy of data which would support re-
gistration of the product by another is underlined. 
8 See text at notes 31-48, infra. 
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agency, the United States Department of Agriculture, generally 
held data submitted as confidential. 9 
Because of concern over the effects upon the pesticide industry 
of having such data kept confidential, and partially in response to 
the growing concern for public access to the data upon which gov-
ernment decisions are based, Congress enacted in 1972 the first of 
three amendments to FIFRAlo which have gradually diminished 
the protection given to trade secret data. The most recent amend-
ments (in 1978)11 authorized EPA to rely, within certain limita-
tions, upon the data submitted by one company to register an-
other company's product and also to disclose to the public certain 
data relating to the safety and efficacy of a registered pesticide. 12 
Pesticide companies have claimed that EPA's handling of the 
data in this manner violates their property right to prevent unau-
thorized use or disclosure of the data and destroys the value of 
the data as trade secrets. They contend that this amounts to a 
"taking" of private property for public use without just compen-
sation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.18 
This article will address the "taking" issue with respect to 
trade secret datal. submitted to the government under FIFRA. It 
will be assumed that pesticide producers do, in fact, have a prop-
erty right to prevent unauthorized use or disclosure of their 
data. II The focus will be upon the implications of the Supreme 
• See note 32, infra. 
10 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 
975 (1972) [hereinafter referred to in text as 1972 FIFRA]. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. 
Costle. 443 F.Supp. 1024, 1033-1040 (N.D. Cal. 1978), for a discussion of the legislative 
history of the 1972 amendments. 
11 Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 843 [hereinafter referred 
to in text as 1978 FIFRA or FIFRA]. 
,. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1979) (authorizing EPA to rely on data), see 
note 52, infra; 7 U.S.C.A. § 136h(bHd) (West Supp. 1979) (authorizing disclosure), see 
note 57, infra. 
11 "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. 
CONST. amend. v. 
,. The term "data" hereinafter will mean data submitted by pesticide companies to 
meet the safety and efficacy requirements of FIFRA. 
,. This is not as innocent an assumption as it appears. It is, in fact, a critical issue. 
There is quite a dispute as to whether trade secrets are property. The authors of the Re-
statement of Torts, for instance, in reviewing the common law stated: 
The suggestion that one has a right to exclude others from the use of his trade secret 
because he has a right of p.·operty in the idea has been frequently advanced and re-
jected. The theory that has prevailed is that the protection is afforded only by a gen-
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Court's recent analysis of "taking" jurisprudence in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,I6 and the claims made 
by pesticide companies in Amchem Products Co. v. Costle,17 a 
suit pending in the Southern District of New York representative 
of those brought by chemical companies to challenge EPA's han-
dling of the data. 
The article will begin with an outline of the statutory changes 
of FIFRA which have precipitated the pesticide companies' con-
cerns. The second section will briefly outline the arguments 
presented in the Amchem litigation and will discuss the power of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause, further discussing the 
traditional distinctions between compensable and non-compensa-
ble governmental actions. The third section will be an analysis of 
the "taking" jurisprudence concepts presented in Penn Central. 
In the fourth section, an application of these concepts to the par-
ticular issues in Amchem will be presented. 
II. THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
FIFRA was originally enacted in 194718 and applied only to 
pesticides shipped in interstate commerce. From that time until 
1970, it was administered by the United States Department of 
eral duty of good faith and that the liability rests upon breach of this duty; that is, 
breach of contract, abuse of confidence, or impropriety in the method of ascertaining 
the secret." 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757 Comment a (1939). See also Justice Holmes' often-quoted 
opinion on trade secrets in E.!. DuPont DeNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 
(1917). 
Others have found no difficulty in finding that trade secrets are property: 
[T]he property view underlies protection of trade secret decisions, and is, in fact, the 
keystone upon which the protection body of case law rests. The existence of a protect-
able property interest is the basis for equity jurisdiction, and for remedies such as dec-
laration of a constructive trust and injunctive relief. 
R.M. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 1.09 (1977). See also W.L. Wearly v. FTC, 462 F.Supp. 
589 (D.N.J. 1978). Ct. Dow Chemical Co. v. Costle, 464 F.Supp. 395 (E.D. Mich. 1978); 
Mobay Chemical Co. v. Costle, 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1572 (W.U. Mo. 1978) (three judge 
pane)), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 439 U.S. 320 (1979), (both cases held that 
the 1972 FIFRA created no property right which could not be altered by subsequent 
amendment). A finding of no property right at all would necessarily obviate any Fifth 
Amendment claims . 
.. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
" Civ. No. 76-2913 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 9, 1978). On August 15, 1979, a preliminary 
injunction was granted which prohibited the EPA from relying on or disclosing plaintiffs' 
trade seCret data. 
11 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (cur-
rent version at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West Supp. 1979)). 
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Agriculture and was considered little more than a labelling law_III 
In 1970, administration was transferred to the Environmental 
Protection Agency_20 Since 1947, the law has required that pesti-
cides be registered with the administrating agency_ The basic pur-
pose of the registration procedure is to ensure that marketed pes-
ticides are safe, effective and environmentally sound_21 Data 
demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the pesticide can be re-
quired_22 If the use of a pesticide could result in a residue in or on 
a food crop, a tolerance for such use also has to be established 
pursuant to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act;28 
In 1972, amendments transformed FIFRA by giving the EPA 
much broader regulatory power over the pesticide industry_I. 
While continuing the registration procedure, the amendments 
made further requirements for data submission26 and also re-
quired reregistration of pesticides previously registered under 
FIFRA in order to ensure that the more stringent data require-
ments were met for older products as well as for newer ones_2B In 
addition, the scope of the law was extended to encompass pesti-
cides marketed in intrastate commerce_27 The 1972 amendments 
also reflected the growing congressional concern, fostered by pas-
sage of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966,28 of allowing 
public access to the data upon which governmental decisions were 
based_III Congress therefore included a general mandate provision 
which provided that, unless otherwise protected within FIFRA, 
data received by EPA, as well as other scientific information 
'8 See H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971) . 
•• Reorg. Plan No.3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970 compilation), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. app, at 609 (1970) and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970). 
II See H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1972); S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5 (1977) . 
•• 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(I)(D) (West Supp. 1979). See note 52, infra . 
•• See Section 408 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a 
(West 1972 & Supp. 1979). The Administrator of the EPA may also exempt a pesticide 
from the requirement of a tolerance. Id. Data submitted to comply with this Act is also 
used to support registration of the pesticide . 
•• See H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971) . 
•• See Dow Chemical Co. v. Train, 423 F.Supp. 1359, 1362 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (discussion 
of the 1972 amendments) . 
•• Id . 
.. Id . 
•• Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II 
1979». See also, 40 Fed. Reg. 21,987-22,002 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 28,814-15 (1975) (EPA's 
proposed regulations under FOIA) . 
•• See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 443 F.Supp. 1024, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
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deemed by the agency to be relevant, should be made available to 
the public within thirty days after EPA registers a pesticide.30 
Prior to 1972, there was no mention of trade secrets within 
FIFRA. Formulas for products and data submitted in certain cir-
cumstances, such as in administrative hearings to review the pro-
posed denial of an application, were expressly required to be kept 
confidential. 31 Otherwise, agency regulations and practices gov-
erned what could and could not be done with data.32 Along with 
the general mandate provision, the 1972 amendments also in-
cluded specific protection for trade secrets33 which has remained 
unchanged through the most recent FIFRA amendments. The 
trade secrets provision of FIFRA requires EPA not to "make pub-
lic information which in [its] judgment contains or relates to 
trade secrets or commercial or financial information obtained 
from a person and privileged or confidential. . . . ":34 If EPA pro-
poses to make public information which the submitting company 
(also known as the "producer" or "submitter") believes to be a 
trade secret, EPA is required to give thirty days written notice to 
the producer of the agency's judgment that the data are not trade 
secrets.3~ 
In support of applications for pesticide registration, companies 
are required to submit, among other things, a complete· copy of 
the label of the product,36 the product formula, and a statement 
s. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979). 
i, See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 135b(c) (1964) (superseded 1972). The Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1905 (1976), punishes the disclosure of trade secret and other confidential information 
by any officer or employee of the United States "in any manner or to any extent not 
authorized by law." Since disclosure of safety and efficacy data is mandated under FIFRA, 
this statute does not apply. 
s, See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1.3(b)(l) (1949)(providing that data submitted to support pesti-
cide applications not be made available to persons outside the agency). See also 7 C.F.R. § 
1.4(b)(15) (1962) (providing that data concerning products and formulations provided by 
industry in connection with registration are admini~tratively confidential); 7 C.F.R. § 
370.13(d) (1968) (providing that trade secrets, scientific and technical data on products, 
process or methods, and data in research studies are confidential). 
33 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 975 (1972). 
See note 57, infra, for the current codification of this provision. 
3. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136h(b) (West Supp. 1979). However, the section also provides that: 
"when necessary to carry out the provisions of this [Act] information relating to formulas 
of products acquired by authorization of this [Act] may be revealed to any Federal agency 
consulted and may be revealed at a public hearing or in findings of fact issued by the 
Administrator." Id. 
3. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136h(c) (West Supp. 1979). 
3. The label must bear an "ingredient statement" on a prominent place on the container 
which sets forth: 
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of all the claims made for the product.37 If requested by EPA, 
applicants are also required to submit a "full description of the 
tests made and the results thereof upon which the claims are 
based. . . . "38 It is data submitted for this purpose that has 
caused such consternation in the pesticide industry. If EPA finds 
that the pesticide lives up to its claims and will not cause unrea-
sonably adverse effects on the environment, the pesticide is regis-
tered and thus may be marketed.39 Because the information sup-
porting registration would be valuable to companies that wished 
to use it to register a similar pesticide or to use it for other pur-
poses,·o much of the information submitted by the producing 
companies is maintained by them as trade secrets.oil In submitting 
data to support registrations, companies are required to mark and 
submit separately those portions of the data which they wish to 
keep secret.·2 
The 1972 FIFRA amendments also authorized EPA to rely on 
data and information submitted by one applicant to determine 
whether a subsequent applicant had made the necessary showings 
of safety and efficacy.43 EPA's authorization to so use the data 
was limited by two restrictions. The agency was not to use any 
data protected by the newly enacted trade secret provision and it 
was able to rely on unprotected data only if the applicant for re-
gistration had offered to pay reasonable compensation to the 
company which had originally submitted the data,"· This so 
called mandatory licensing provision thus allowed a company to 
(1) the name and percentage of each active ingredient, and the total percentage of all 
inert ingredients, in the pesticide; and 
(2) if the pesticide contains arsenic in any form, a statement of the percentages of 
total and water soluble arsenic, calculated as elementary arsenic. 
7 U.S.C. § 136(n) (West Supp. 1979). 
37 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(l) (West Supp. 1979). 
38 [d. The tests are used by EPA to help determine whether the product is safe, effec-
tive and environmentally sound. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 162 (1979). Safety and efficacy data are 
routinely submitted as the burden is on the applicant to prove that the product is environ-
mentally safe and lives up to all claims made for it. [d. at 162.6(B). See 40 C.F.R. 162.8, 
162.45 (1979) (requirements for data submission) . 
•• 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(2)(D)(5) (West Supp. 1979). No pesticide may be marketed with-
out registration. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(a) (West Supp. 1979). 
•• See text at notes 72-74, infra . 
.. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 443 F.Supp. 1024, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1978) . 
•• 7 U.S.C.A. § 136h(a) (West Supp. 1979) . 
.. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 975 (1972) 
(current version at 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1979» . 
.. [d. 
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register its product on the basis of non-trade secret data previ-
ously submitted by a competing company to register its own simi-
lar product. A registration on this basis is referred to as a "me-
too" registration within the industry.411 Prior to this time, EPA 
routinely considered data submitted by previous applicants in 
granting later applications by competitors for products with an 
identical formula.·· While a number of courts have noted this 
practice,·" there is a question as to whether the practice was ad-
ministratively proper.·· Nevertheless, the new provision sanc-
tioned the practice and allowed a subsequent applicant a right to 
use previously submitted data upon offering reasonable 
compensation. 
Because of uncertainty as to whether the compensation require-
ment related to all data submitted under FIFRA or only to that 
submitted after the 1972 amendments, Congress again amended 
FIFRA in 1975.·' The new law provided that the two limitations 
imposed by the mandatory licensing provision applied only to 
data submitted on or after January 1, 1970.10 Thus, data submit-
ted prior to January 1, 1970, could be relied on by subsequent 
applicants without compensation regardless of trade secret status. 
Data submitted after that date could be relied on as set out under 
the 1972 FIFRA amendments . 
•• See Mobay Chemical Corp. v. C08t1e, 447 F.Supp. 811, 834 (W.D. Mo. 1978). 
•• The practice was so widely known that the National Agricultural Chemical Associa-
tion (NACA) took a position against it before Congress: 
Under the present law registration information submitted to the Administrator has not 
routinely been made available for public inspection. Such information has, however, as 
a matter of practice but without statutory authority, been considered by the Adminis-
trator to support the registration of the same or a similar product by another 
registrant. 
"Statement Relative to Exclusive Use of Data Provision of H.R. 10729," contained in RE-
PORT or SENATE AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY COMM., S. REp. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Se88. 
pt. 2 at 18-19 reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD NEWS 3993, 4040 . 
•• See, e.g., Amchem Products, Inc. V. GAP Corp., 391 F.Supp. 124, 128 (N.D. Ga. 1975); 
Mobay Chemical Corp. V. C08t1e, 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1572, 1580 n. 22 (W.D. Mo. 1978) 
(three judge panel), appeal dismissed lor want 01 jurisdiction, 439 U.S. 320 (1979) . 
•• See, e.g., Mobay Chemical CO. V. C08t1e, 439 U.S. 320 (1979). In that case the Su-
preme Court, considering FIFRA as amended in 1975, noted that the statute neither au-
thorized nor forbade this agency practice. Id . 
•• Pub. L. No. 94-140, 89 Stat. 755 (1975). See Mobay Chemical Corp. V. C08t1e, 12 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1572,1573-74,1578-79 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (three judge panel) (discuasion 
of effects of 1972 and 1975 amendments and Congressional motives in making 1975 
amendments). 
10 Pub. L. No. 94-140, 89 Stat. 755 (1975) (current version at 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(I)(D) 
(West Supp. 1979». 
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In the 1978 amendments to FIFRA,ol Congress again amended 
the mandatory licensing provision by providing that "a citation to 
data that appear in the public literature or that previously had 
been submitted to [EPA] and that [EPA] may consider in accor-
dance with [specified] provisions"os would satisfy the test data re-
quirement. The "specified" provisions required that EPA not 
consider data submitted on or after January 1, 1970 for a period 
of fifteen years after the submission unless the company seeking 
registration makes a specific offer of compensation to the data 
producer for part of the cost of producing the data.03 Under the 
., Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 . 
•• 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1979). This section provides: 
Each applicant for registration of a pesticide shall file with the Administrator a state-
ment which includes- ... (D) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c)(2)(D) of 
this section, if requested by the Administrator, a full description of the tests made and 
the results thereof upon which the claims are based, or alternatively a citation to data 
that appear in the public literature or that previously had been submitted to the Ad-
ministrator and that the Administrator may consider in accordance with the following 
provisions: 
(i) with respect to pesticides containing active ingredients that are initially registered 
under this [Act] after September 30, 1978, data submitted to support the application 
for the original registration of the pesticide, or an application for an amendment ad-
ding any new use to the registration and that pertains solely to such new use, shall not, 
without the written permission of the original data submitter, be considered by the 
Administrator to support an application by another person during a period of ten years 
following the date the Administrator first registers the pesticide: Provided, That such 
permission shall not be required in the case of defensive data; 
(ii) except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (D)(i) of this paragraph, with re-
spect to data submitted after December 31, 1969, by an applicant or registrant to sup-
port an application for registration, experimental use permit, or amendment adding a 
new use to an existing registration, to support or maintain in effect an existing registra-
tion, or for registration, the Administrator may, without the permission of the original 
data submitter, consider any such item of data in support of an application by any 
other person (hereinafter in this subparagraph referred to as the "applicant") within 
the fifteen-year period following the date the data were originally submitted only if the 
applicant has made an offer to compensate the original data submitter and submitted 
such offer to the Administrator accompanied by evidence of delivery to the original 
data submitter of the offer. The terms and amount of compensation may be fixed by 
agreement between the original data submitter and the applicant, or, failing such 
agreement, binding arbitration under this subparagraph. If, at the end of ninety days 
after the date of delivery to the original data submitter of the offer to compensate, the 
original data submitter and the applicant have neither agreed on the amount and terms 
of compensation nor on a procedure far reaching an agreement on the amount and 
terms of compensation, either person may initiate binding arbitration proceedings by 
requesting the Federal Mediation and Concilliation Service to appoint an arbitrator 
from the roster of arbitrators maintained by such Service. 
The section continues with details of the arbitration procedure . 
•• 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1979). See note 52, supra. 
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so called "exclusive use" provision, data submitted to support the 
registration of a product registered after September 30, 1978 may 
not, however, be considered by EPA for a period of ten years af-
ter it registers the product.M The original data producer may 
waive both the compensation and ten year "exclusive use" provi-
sions:11I Data submitted before January 1, 1970 may be considered 
by EPA without compensation to, or the permission of, the origi-
nal producer. lie 
In 1978, Congress also introduced a provision (known as the 
"disclosure provision")117 which allows disclosure to the public of 
.. Id . 
•• Id . 
•• See 7 V.S.C.A. 136a(c)(I)(D)(iii) (West Supp. 1979). 
07 7 V.S.C.A. § 136h(b)-§ 136h(d)(l) (West Supp. 1979). 
(b) Disclosure.-Notwithstanding any other provision of this [Act], and subject to the 
limitations in subsections (d) and (e) of this section the Administrator shall not make 
public information which in his judgment contains or relates to trade secrets or commer-
cial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential, except 
that, when necessary to carry out the provisions of this [Act), information relating to for-
mulas of products acquired by authorization of this [Act) may be revealed to any Federal 
agency consulted and may be revealed at a public hearing or in findings of fact issued by 
the Administrator. 
(c) Disputes.-If the Administrator proposes to release for inspection information 
which the applicant or registrant believes to be protected from disclosure under subsection 
(b) of this section, he shall notify the applicant or registrant, in writing, by certified mail. 
The Administrator shall not thereafter make available for inspection such data until thirty 
days after receipt of the notice by the applicant or registrant. During this period, the 
applicant or registrant may institute an action in an appropriate district court for a declar-
atory judgment as to whether such information is subject to protection under subsection 
(b) of this section. 
(d) Limitations.-
(1) All information concerning the objectives, methodology, results, or significance of 
any test or experiment performed on or with a registered or previously registered pesticide 
or its separate ingredients, impurities, or degradation products, and any information con-
cerning the effects of such pesticide on any organism or the behavior of such pesticide in 
the environment, including, but not limited to, data on safety to fish and wildlife, humans 
and other mammals, plants, animals, and soil, and studies on persistence, translocation 
and fate in the environment, and metabolism, shall be available for disclosure to the pub-
lic: Provided, That the use of such data for any registration purpose shall be governed by 
section 136a of this section: Provided further, That this paragraph does not authorize the 
disclosure of any information that-
(A) discloses manufacturing or quality control processes, 
(B) discloses the details of any methods for testing, detecting, or measuring the 
quantity of any deliberately added inert ingredient of a pesticide, or 
(C) discloses the identity or percentage quantity of any deliberately added inert 
ingredient of a pesticide 
unless the Administrator has first determined that disclosure is necessary to protect 
against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. 
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data relating to the safety and efficacy of a pesticide. liS However, 
any data which would reveal manufacturing or quality control 
processes, details of methods of discovering deliberately added in-
ert ingredients, or the identity or percentage of deliberately ad-
ded inert ingredients (unless EPA determines disclosure of such 
information is necessary for health or environmental reasons) are 
not authorized for disclosure under this provision.1i9 In addition, 
any data disclosed are subject to any applicable compensation or 
exclusive use limitations when used for registration purposes. so 
The mandatory licensing and disclosure provisions apply 
whether or not the producer has designated and maintained the 
data as trade secrets and whether or not EPA would have consid-
ered the data in question to be trade secrets under the trade 
secrets provision.s1 
In the legislative history of both the 1972 and 1975 amend-
ments there is considerable debate over the lack of competition 
within the pesticide industry and the trade-off's between the con-
flicting objectives of environmental protection and the economic 
advantages afforded by using pesticides. S2 In amending FIFRA in 
1978, Congress was immediately concerned with the virtual halt 
in the registration of pesticides which resulted from litigation 
challenging the various provisions of the 1975 amendments.ss 
Congress hoped to undo the logjam by further clarifying defini-
tions and restrictions and by streamlining the registration proce-
.8 Efficacy tests concern the performance of the product and are usually based on com-
parisons of results achieved under controlled conditions. Safety tests relate to the toxicity 
of the product and deal with the effects on laboratory animals, chemical analyses to deter-
mine the presence of harmful residues, and environmental impact. Safety test methodol-
ogy is generally standardized throughout the industry, but the design and methodology of 
efficacy tests may constitute trade secrets. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 443 
F.Supp. 1025, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1978). In addition, EPA publishes guidelines describing the 
data requirements in greater detail and prescribing acceptable standards and protocols of 
data development. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 162, 163, 180 (1979) . 
•• 7 U.S.C.A. § 136h(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979). See note 57, supra. 
80 Id. 
81 See notes 52 and 57 supra. 
_ •• See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 443 F.Supp. 1025, 1033-40 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (ap-
pendix discussing legislative history of 1972 amendments); Schulburg, The Proposed 
FIFRA Amendments of 1977: Untangling the Knot of Pesticide Registration, 2 HARV. 
ENVT'L. L. REV. 342 (1977) (discussion of the background of the 1975 amendments and 
concerns leading to 1978 amendments). 
88 H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1977); S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 3 (1977). See note 85, infra, for the names of two of the cases challenging the 1975 
amendments. 
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duresu while still promoting the original concerns of the 1972 and 
1975 amendments. Thus, the encouragement of competition 
within the pesticides industry and the prevention of undue com-
petitive advantage derived as a result of government regula-
tions;60 the spreading of the costs of developing safety and effi-
cacy data among the pesticide producers;66 and the elimination, 
as far as practicable, of duplicative testing67 were all factors in 
Congress' decisions in 1978. There was also discussion of the de-
sirability of conforming FIFRA to the Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TSCA)68 which, from the time of its enactment in 1976, has 
allowed disclosure of safety and efficacy data. Clear definition of 
the public's right of access to test data was a further 
consideration.69 
In sum, it appears that in the 1970's Congress was trying, at 
least in part, to carry out its objectives concerning the potential 
environmental and health hazards posed by pesticides, the right 
of the public to have access to information, and the lack of com-
petition within the pesticide industry by causing a steady decline 
in the absolute protection granted to data submitted to support 
pesticide registrations. In 1972, non-trade secret data were availa-
ble for use by EPA upon payment of compensation. In 1975, the 
requirement for compensation and the protection of trade secrets 
were removed for data submitted prior to January 1, 1970. In 
1978, safety and efficacy data were made available to the public. 
While the exclusive use provision and the compensation require-
ments of the 1978 FIFRA amendments diminish some of the im-
.. One of the streamlining procedures was to allow "generic" registration of pesticides in 
certain circumstances. The generic registration would be based on the basic chemicals in 
the product and would obviate the need for repeated submissions of data as to such basic 
chemicals. Another procedure would allow conditional registration of pesticides during the 
period in which data needed for complete registration was furnished in certain specified 
situations. See H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1977) . 
•• See, e.g., Extension of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, S. 
REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, 31 (1977) . 
.. [d . 
.. [d . 
.. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 15 V.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (West 
Supp. 1979)). TSCA allows public disclosure of "health and safety" data concerning chem-
ical substances and mixtures distributed in commerce. Manufacturing processes and some 
formula information are excepted. 15 V.S.C. § 2613(b) (1976). Pesticides subject to regula-
tion under FIFRA are excluded from regulation under TSCA. 15 V.S.C. § 2602(2)(B)(ii) 
(1976) . 
•• 123 CONGo REC. S13,091 (daily ed. July 29, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Leahy); [d. at 
S13,095 (remarks of Sen. Lugar). 
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pact of unrestricted use and disclosure, the 1978 law made a sig-
nificant inroad upon a producer's ability to maintain absolute 
protection of his data. 
III. GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE AMCHEM LITIGATION 
A. The Issues in Amchem 
As noted above,70 the mandatory licensing and disclosure provi-
sions ofFIFRA apply whether or not the producer has designated 
and maintained the data as trade secrets. Many companies in the 
pesticide industry are concern~d about the effects of these provi-
sions in allowing competitors to benefit from their data: the com-
panies fear that competitors will be able to enter the marketplace 
at lower start-up costs since they do not have to produce data to 
support registrations.71 The companies also fear that rivals who 
gain access to the safety and efficacy data will be able to derive 
other benefits from them which will reduce the producer's com-
petitive advantage.72 Specifically, the data are also valuable for 
meeting state or foreign registration requirements, defining and 
supporting advertising and warranty claims, defending against 
product liability actions, providing leads for product development 
and improvement, and for discovering cost efficient manufactur-
ing and research methodology and other spin-off technology as 
well.73 In any case, the companies are concerned with the loss of 
the competitive advantage that would result from the mandatory 
licensing and disclosure of their trade secret data. 7• 
In Amchem Products Co. v. Costle,711 approximately seventy-
five chemical companies claim that these provisions of FIFRA vi-
olate the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in 
two respects. First, as to data submitted prior to the effective 
date of the 1978 amendments, the provisions are claimed to con-
stitute a deprivation of property without due process of law in 
that they effect a "retroactive taking" of the data.76 Second, as to 
7. See text at note 61, supra. 




7. Civ. No. 76-2913 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 9, 1979). 
7. Amchem Memo, supra note 4, at 56-65. Much of the argument on this issue concerns 
application of the holding in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) to the 
situation in the instant litigation. In that case, coal mine operators were retroactively held 
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all data, regardless of date of submission, the prOVISIons are 
claimed to constitute a "taking" of private property for public 
purpose without just compensation." 
The plaintiffs in Amchem maintain that the property right to 
prevent unauthorized use and disclosure of trade secret data in-
heres in the nature of trade secrecy78 and that this right has 
vested by virtue of "federal laws and regulations, and agency 
practice and procedure (as well as state and common law princi-
ples)."79 It is this ability to prevent unauthorized use or disclo-
sure which gives the trade secret commercial value. 
The basic argument of the chemical companies is that the 
FIFRA provisions effect a transfer of the value and right to use 
the data to others, particularly competitors, and that this "appro-
priation" of the data cannot be sustained as a valid regulation 
under the Commerce Clause power.80 Assuming Congress has the 
power to order such transfer when it determines that the public 
interest will be served, it may make such transfer of property only 
upon payment of just compensation.81 The law goes beyond an 
even-handed and nondiscriminatory promotion of competition 
because it takes information the plaintiffs have developed at great 
expense and distributes it to competitors who need pay little or 
nothing.81 The provisions are "takings" both because, in charac-
ter, they are appropriations and also because they destroy the 
commercial value of the trade secrets involved with the resulting 
diminution in value being near total.88 The fact that the data pro-
ducing companies are still allowed to use the data is beside the 
point: 
The cases are unequivocal that when the effect of the government's 
action is to appropriate private property for the use and benefit of 
liable for compensation to former employees who had contracted Black Lung Disease. The 
plaintiffs in Amchem claim that the case sets higher standards for the constitutionality of 
retroactive legislation than for prospective legislation and that these standards are not met 
in the present case. Reply Memo of Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for Preliminary In-
junction at 59-62, Amchem Products Co. v. Costle, Civ. No. 76-2913 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 9, 
1979) [hereinafter cited as Amchem Reply Memo]. This issue is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
71 Amchem Memo, supra note 4, at 40-56. 
7. Id. at 37-40. 
7. Amchem Reply Memo, supra note 76, at 54. 
80 Amchem Memo, supra note 4, at 42-52. 
8l Amchem Reply Memo, supra note 76, at 40. 
n Id. at 42 . 
.. Amchem Memo, supra note 4, at 48. 
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members of the public, it is absolutely irrelevant that the govern-
ment beneficiently allows the original owner to retain some use of the 
property, or to share equally with the public in using the property.s. 
EPA,8I' in reply, attacks the "taking" question first by arguing 
that the plaintiffs in Amchem had no right to prevent use or dis-
closure of the registration data prior to 197288 and that the 1972 
amendments granted no rights which could not be impaired by 
subsequent FIFRA amendments.8? The agency contends that po-
lice power regulations requiring disclosure of trade secrets have 
been enacted and upheld many times and that Congress was act-
ing within its constitutional powers in requiring the mandatory 
licensing and disclosure of trade secret data.88 Finally, EPA ar-
gues that despite the claim of the chemical companies "that the 
[mandatory licensing] and disclosure provisions of the 1978 
FIFRA amendments destroy the value of the data, plaintiffs re-
tain full use of all test data submitted under FIFRA."89 
In essence, the plaintiffs are challenging Congress' power under 
the Commerce Clause90 to affect their alleged property rights in 
trade secret data by amending FIFRA. If, in amending FIFRA in 
1978, Congress was either exceeding its Commerce Clause power 
or using it improperly, the amendments would be void.91 For a 
complete understanding of the issues it is therefore helpful to 
know something about Congress' power under the Commerce 
Clause to affect property rights without compensation. The next 
two subsections present brief overviews of Congress' power under 
the Commerce Clause and some of the tests used by the Supreme 
Court to determine whether governmental action requires 
compensation . 
•• Amchem Reply Memo, supra note 76 at 50-51 (emphasis in original) . 
•• EPA raised arguments in cases involving challenges to the 1975 FIFRA mandatory 
licensing provision similar to those raised in Amchem in Dow Chemical Co. v. Costle, 464 
F. Supp. 395 (E.D. Mich. 1978) and in Mobay Chemical Corp. v. CostIe, 447 F.Supp. 811 
(W.D. Mo. 1978). Both cases held that the 1972 FIFRA created no property rights in trade 
secret data which could not be altered by subsequent amendment . 
• 8 Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 17-36, Amchem Products Co. v. CostIe, Civ. 76-2913 (S.D.N.Y., filed 
July 9, 1979) [hereinafter cited as EPA Memo] . 
• 7 Id. at 39-47. 
··Id . 
• 8 Id. at 65-68. 
O. See note 6, supra. 
0' See text at notes 92-105, infra. 
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B. Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause 
The power of Congress under the Commerce Clause92 is analo-
gous to the "police power" of the states9S and is subject directly 
to the same limitations of the Constitution applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.9' It is undisputed that if 
one of the effects of a federal statute is to deprive a person of 
property without due process of law or without just compensa-
tion, such a statute is invalid as contrary to the Fifth Amend-
ment.91i But, within these Fifth Amendment limitations, there is 
room for congressional regulatory action: 
If the nature and conditions of a restriction upon the use or disposi-
tion of property is such that a State could, under the police power, 
impose it consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment without mak-
ing compensation, then the United States may for a permitted pur-
pose impose a like restriction consistently with the Fifth Amendment 
without making compensation .... 96 
The requirements of the Fifth Amendment are generally satis-
fied where the means of regulation of commerce are appropriate 
to a permissible end.97 The burden is on the one challenging a 
statute to demonstrate the lack of facts to support its validity, as 
congressional exercise of the commerce power is presumed to be 
constitutionally proper.98 The scope of the regulation, whether it 
affects the industry generally or only individual concerns, may 
also be a factor.99 Regulations affecting an industry as a whole, 
even though they reduce property value or increase business risks, 
are not generally construed as "takings. "100 In addition, it has 
•• See note 6, supra . 
•• See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938): "lIlt is no objection to 
the exertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by 
the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the states." [d. at 147. 
For ease of reference, the terms "police power" and "Commerce Clause power" will be 
u!led interchangeably in this paper . 
•• See Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919) . 
•• See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914). See also Louisville 
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935) . 
.. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156-157 (1919). See also Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (this is perhaps the earliest statement of the Com-
merce Clause power). 
17 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148-49 (1938) . 
•• See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, 15 (1976) . 
.. See S. La. Area Rate Cases v. Fed. Pow. Comm'n, 428 F.2d 407, 428 (5th Cir. 1970), 
cert. den. 400 U.S. 950 (1970), on reh. 444 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1971). 
'00 [d. 
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been said that those who deal in a regulated field cannot object if 
the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments 
to achieve the legislative end.lol Even when legislation burdens 
one more than others, a "taking" claim must rest on the particu-
lar facts of the case, as the Supreme Court has long recognized 
that "legislation designed to promote the general welfare com-
monly burdens some more than others. "102 
The plaintiffs in Amchem concede Congress' power to regulate 
the pesticide industry under the Commerce Clause in order to 
promote the public health and welfare. lOS In addition, the regula-
tion of competition is one of the oldest and most well-developed 
powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause. l04 The courts 
traditionally have accorded wide latitude to Congress in its efforts 
to enhance competition in furtherance of the public good.loll 
Thus, the issue in Amchem is not whether Congress may regulate 
the production of pesticides. Rather, the issue is whether, in so 
doing, Congress has contravened the Fifth Amendment. 
C. Compensable and Non-Compensable Actions: Police Power 
v. Eminent Domain 
Traditionally, the police power has been viewed as the inherent 
101 F.H.A. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958) (upholding law prohibiting those 
who held certain federal mortgages for multifamily units from renting to transients). 
10J Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978). 
103 Amchem Memo, supra note 4, at 42. Nor do the plaintiffs object to the policy of 
public review. The companies do, however, object to the fact that Congress has, in carrying 
out its policies, allowed competitors to gain access to their data. The plaintiffs have offered 
to permit review of the data by responsible scientists under assurance of confidentiality. 
Id. at 43. 
104 See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, (1904). 
Whether the free operation of the normal laws of competition is a wise and wholesome 
rule for trade and commerce is an economic question which this court need not con-
sider or determine. Undoubtedly, there are those who think that the general business 
interests and prosperity of the country will be best promoted if the rule of competition 
is not applied. But there are others who believe that such a rule is more necessary in 
these days of enormous wealth than it ever was in any former period of our history. Be 
all this as it may, Congress has, in effect, recognized the rule of free competition by 
declaring illegal every combination or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and interna-
tional commerce. As in the judgment of Congress the public convenience and the gen-
eral welfare will be best subserved when the natural laws of competition are left undis-
turbed by those engaged in interstate commerce, and as Congress has embodied that 
rule in a statute, that must be, for all, the end of the matter, if this is to remain a 
government of laws, and not of men. 
Id. at 337-38. 
10' Id. 
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power of the sovereign to promulgate regulations designed to pro-
mote the public health, morals, safety, convenience or general 
prosperity. lOS The power of eminent domain was seen as the un-
limited power of the sovereign to take private property for public 
use upon the payment of just compensation. l07 The powers were 
viewed as operating within separate ambits. lOS Government "regu-
lation" which prevented a property owner from using his property 
in a way deemed injurious to public health, safety or welfare was 
a non-compensable exercise of the police power even though the 
owner's property value was impaired by reason of the regula-
tion. l08 If, however, government action, although in furtherance of 
public welfare, resulted in physical invasion of the property, such 
that the property became, in effect, devoted to public use, it was 
viewed as a compensable "taking" under the government's power 
of eminent domain.110 
At times, however, the police power was seen as merging with 
the power of eminent domain. Justice Holme!::' statement in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,111 where a law forbidding the 
mining of coal in certain instances was found to constitute a "tak-
ing", is the classic expression of this viewpoint: 
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing. . . . We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to 
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the 
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the 
change.us 
This question of degree, where regulation ends and "taking" 
begins, has been an important factor in a number of "taking" 
cases.113 The Supreme Court has recently phrased the question in 
terms of whether governmental action so frustrates "distinct in-
... See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1906). 
'07 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). 
'.8 See Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Deci· 
sian, 91 HARv. L. REV. 402, 404 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Costonis) . 
••• See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
11. See Northern Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878). 
111 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See text at notes 164·170, infra. 
m 260 U.S. at 415·16 . 
... See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (government's destruction 
of a materialman's lien in certain property held a "taking"); Hudson Water Co. v. Mc· 
Carter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (if height restriction makes property wholly useless "the right 
to property prevails over the public interest" and compensation is required). 
1980] TRADE SECRETS 611 
vestment-backed expectations" as to amount to a "taking."l14 
In zoning cases, and recently with respect to historic preserva-
tion laws/HI the Supreme Court has looked to the economic value 
of the uses of the property remaining to the property owner after 
the governmental regulation, rather than to any quantum of im-
pact on his expectations, to decide whether a "taking" has oc-
curred.116 If the Court finds that the property owner has retained 
"reasonable beneficial use" of the property, the governmental reg-
ulation is not a "taking" even though the property owner might 
suffer severe economic loss.117 
In certain other instances, the Court has focused its attention 
on the fact that the government's action can be characterized as 
an appropriation of the claimant's property.ll8 In these cases, the 
Court is concerned with whether the government's action effec-
tively excludes the claimant from using his propertyll9 or results 
from the government's acting for some strictly governmental pur-
pose. l2O If either of these factors is found, the government's action 
may be construed as a "taking. "Ill 
One issue for the district court to decide in Amchem is which 
test to use in addressing the "taking" claim. Because a particular 
governmental action might be recognized as a "taking" under one 
test but not under another, there is a theoretical tension between 
the tests. Whether the district court uses a "reasonable beneficial 
use" test, a "distinct investment-backed expectations" test or an 
"appropriation" test is thus of critical importance in Amchem. As 
the Supreme Court has stated that "taking" claims must be re-
solved on the particular facts in issue,1I2 the test the district court 
employs is likely to be also a product of these facts . 
... Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). 
110 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
"8 See Costonis, supra note 108, at 407. 
117 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Goldblatt v. 
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
118 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. Cress, 243 
U.S. 316 (1916). 
118 See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 148-49 (1923). 
"0 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978) 
111 See text at notes 143-156, infra . 
.. I United States v. Central Eureka Min. Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). 
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IV. THE ANALYSIS OF "TAKING" JURISPRUDENCE IN Penn 
Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York 
Much of the law concerning "takings" developed in response in 
cases concerning property rights in land. In Amchem, both the 
chemical compan1es and EPA rely on land cases in arguing the 
"taking" issue. In addition, in Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle, 
where it was held that the 1975 FIFRA mandatory licensing pro-
vision did not effect a "taking" of Mobay's trade secret data, the 
district court used principles derived from land "taking" cases in 
reaching its decision.12S The Supreme Court itself has used such 
principles in deciding cases involving intangible properties such 
as a materialman's lien or contracts.124 For these reasons, there 
should be no impediment to using principles derived from land 
"taking" cases in analyzing the trade secrets "taking" claim in 
Amchem. 
As it is representative of the Supreme Court's analysis of land 
"taking" claims, the recent decision in Penn Central Trans. Co. v. 
City of New York 121 deserves close attention. In that case, Penn 
Central challenged the constitutionality of New York City's 
Landmark Preservation Law, which was enacted to protect his-
toric landmarks from precipitous decisions that might destroy or 
fundamentally alter their character. The law prevented the rail-
road company and its lessee from adding a fifty-five-story office 
tower atop its Grand Central Terminal in midtown Manhattan. 
Penn Central claimed, inter alia, that the application of the 
". The issues in this case were initially split between a district court and a three judge 
panel. The district court decided the issues relating to whether plaintiffs' data warranted 
trade secret protection. 447 F. Supp. 811 (W.D. Mo. 1978). The court held that data which 
met the Restatement of Torts definition of trade secrets must be protected as such. Id. at 
834-5. The three judge panel heard the constitutional challenges. 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 
1572 (W.D. Mo. 1978). The three judge panel held that the 1975 FIFRA mandatory licens-
ing provision did not effect a "taking" of Mobay's trade secret data. This decision was 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. 439 U.S. 320 (1979). The Supreme Court found 
no jurisdiction as the plaintiffs' dispute was not with the statute but with agency practice. 
The Court dismissed the appeal but did not vacate the judgment of the three judge panel. 
Id. 
For a discussion of the 1975 FIFRA mandatory licensing provision, see text at notes 49-
50, supra. 
"4 See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (materialman's lien); Omnia 
Commercial Co., Inc., v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923) (contract rights). 
". 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For an excellent presentation of the issues in this case and the 
development of "taking" jurisprudence generally, see Scott, Alas in Wonderland: The Im-
pact of Penn Central v. New York Upon Historic Preservation Law and Policy, 7 B.C. 
ENV. AFF. L. REV. 317 (1978). 
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Landmark Law had "taken" its property, specifically the right to 
develop the air space above the terminal, without just compensa-
tion, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court first established that the New York City law was not 
rendered invalid because it failed to provide compensation when-
ever a landowner had been restricted in the exploitation of prop-
erty interests to a greater extent than was provided for in applica-
ble zoning laws.12e It next considered whether the interference 
with Penn Central's property right was of such magnitude that 
"there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation 
to sustain [it]",127 and focused its inquiry on the impact of regula-
tion on the Grand Central Terminal site. The Court stressed that 
the law did not interfere with Penn Central's present use of the 
terminal in any way. Rather, the designation as a landmark not 
only permitted but contemplated that Penn Central "may con-
tinue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 
65 years. . . . "128 Further, while Penn Central had been prohib-
ited from constructing the tower over the terminal, it had not 
been prohibited from other construction which might not alter 
the character of the building. Finally, noting that the Landmark 
Law allowed Penn Central to transfer air rights to other proper-
ties it owned in the area, the Court stated: "While these rights 
may well not have constituted 'just compensation' if a 'taking' 
had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate 
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on [Penn Cen-
tral] and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in consid-
ering the impact of regulation."128 Finding that "[t]he restrictions 
imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general 
welfare and ... permit reasonable beneficial use of the 
Landmark site,"130 the Court upheld the Landmark Law in a 6-3 
decision, thus sustaining use of the police power to promote his-
toric preservation. 
In the course of the Penn Central decision, the Court reviewed 
"the factors that have shaped the jurisprudence of the Fifth 
Amendment injunction 'nor shall private property be taken for 
... 438 u.s. at 128-136 . 
... ld. at 136, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) . 
... ld . 
... ld. at 137 . 
... ld. at 138. 
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public use, without just compensation.' "131 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Brennan stated: 
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular 
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particu-
lar governmental action has effected a taking [sic], this Court focuses 
rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and ex-
tent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. . . .181 
Three concepts critical to the Court's analysis of "taking" 
claims are set forth in this statement. First, the concept of the 
"parcel as a whole" establishes the boundaries of the Court's in-
quiry into property rights affected by governmental action. Sec-
ond, the concept of the "character of the action" indicates that 
the kind of government action is a relevant factor. Third, the con-
cept of "nature and extent of the interference" indicates that the 
degree of regulation is also a factor. How these concepts (herein 
referrred to by the phrases in quotation marks above) are em-
ployed by the Court is best seen by examination of cases in which 
these factors were particularly significant. 
A. The "Parcel as a Whole" 
In one of its most extensive definitions of property, the Su-
preme Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment protection of 
property "is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may 
possess. "133 It is against the totality of these interests, "the parcel 
as a whole," that the effects of the Government's actions are mea-
sured. l34 It is important, then, to ascertain how the Court defines 
this "parcel as a whole." The case of Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead136 offers a good example of how the Court approaches this 
issue. 
In Goldblatt, a town ordinance prohibited excavation opera-
tions below the level of the water table. The law also imposed an 
affirmative duty to refill any excavations below that level. Gold-
III [d. at 123. 
,.. [d. at 130-31. 
... U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,378 (1945) (holding that compensation to 
be paid for government's temporary occupancy of building under long-term lease to plain-
tiff must be based upon market rental value of building on lease by long-term tenant to 
temporary occupier). 
IS' See text at note 132, supra . 
... 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
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blatt, owner of a lot which had been used for excavation of sand 
and gravel for over forty years, claimed that the ordinance pre-
vented him from continuing his business and that this prohibition 
without compensation was a "taking" of his property without due 
process of law. At the time of the litigation, twenty of Goldblatt's 
thirty-eight acres were covered with a lake, resulting from the ex-
cavation operations, with an average depth of twenty-five feet. Al-
though it noted that "[t]here is no set formula to determine 
where regulation ends and taking begins,"136 the Supreme Court 
declined to decide whether the regulation went so far as to 
amount to a "taking". "Indulging in the usual presumption of 
constitutionality,"137 the Court found no evidence in the record 
which even "remotely suggest[ed] that prohibition of further min-
ing will reduce the value of the lot in question."138 The Court up-
held the ordinance despite the assumed validity of the "supposi-
tion" that, as Goldblatt had claimed, the eighteen acres 
surrounding the lake could not be mined because there would be 
no area left for processing operations.13s Thus, even though Gold-
blatt claimed, and the Court supposed, that he would be entirely 
prevented from carrying on his business, the Court was unable to 
conclude that Goldblatt had met the burden of proving that the 
value of his property would be unreasonably diminished by the 
prohibition. 
By casting the burden of proof on Goldblatt, the Court, in ef-
fect, assumed that other reasonable uses of the land existed. The 
Court's citation of a case where the diminution in property value 
because of an ordinance prohibiting certain uses of the property 
was from $800,000 to $60,000 as an example of the principle that 
comparisons of value of the property before and after regulations 
are "relevant" but "not conclusive" of the regulation's validity is 
an indication of the difficulty a claimant faces in overcoming the 
assumption.140 Indeed, the Court in Goldblatt cited one of its ear-
lier opinions in another police power case for the proposition that 
the exercise of the police power would be upheld if any state of 
II. [d. at 594. 
187 [d . 
... [d. (footnote omitted). 
II. [d. at 596. The court also recognized that "one could imagine that preventing further 
deepening of a pond already 25 feet deep would have a de minimis effect on public 
safety." [d. at 595. 
I •• [d. at 594, citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
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facts either known or reasonably assumed support it. Hl 
It is perhaps possible that Goldblatt could have won the case 
had he proven that no beneficial use of the property as a whole 
existed after the regulation. However, in Penn Central the Court 
expressly declared its unwillingness to be bound by definitions of 
property interests such that the prohibition of that interest neces-
sarily would deprive the owner of all beneficial uses of the prop-
erty. In discussing Goldblatt and other cases concerning prohibi-
tions of land use, the Court in a footnote stated: 
These cases dispose of any contention that. . . full use of air rights is 
so bound up with the investment-backed expectations of appellants 
that Governmental deprivation of these rights invariably-i.e., irre-
spective of the impact of the restriction on the value of the parcel as a 
whole-constitutes a "taking. "142 
Goldblatt and Penn Central exemplify the Court's approach to 
defining the property interest at stake in the usual "taking" 
claim. In both cases, the property right affected by the legislation 
was severable from other uses of the property and could have 
been valued separately, as mining rights and air rights have often 
been the subject of leasing or sale arrangements. In defining the 
"parcel as a whole," the Court ignored any question of severabil-
ity and looked instead to all possible reasonable uses of the land 
in question. Thus Goldblatt and Penn Central demonstrate that, 
for "taking" purposes, the economic interest against which the 
impact of governmental action will be measured is made up of the 
sum of the property owner's interests and not simply selected in-
terests-no matter how valuable in themselves. 
B. The "Character of the Action" 
In discussing the character of the action as a factor in "taking" 
analysis, the Penn Central opinion stated that "[a] 'taking' may 
more readily be found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by Government . . . than 
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good."14s Later, the Court also noted that "government actions 
that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit 
'4' [d. at 596, citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938). 
'4, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 n.27 (1978). 
'4' [d. at 124. 
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or facilitate uniquely public functions have often been held to 
constitute 'takings.' "144 
In both statements the Court made specific reference to the 
case of United States v. Causbyl41 as illustrative of its meaning. 
There, in a suit for compensation brought by the owner of a 
chicken farm, frequent low-level flights of government aircraft 
were deemed an appropriation of the land directly underneath 
the flight path. Although the Court noted that navigable airspace 
was a "public highway," the Court found that the damages suf-
fered by the claimant were the result of a direct invasion of his 
land.146 The noise and glare of the airplanes destroyed the use of 
the property as a commercial chicken farm, and the government 
was held liable for "taking" an easement of the air rights.147 In a 
footnote, the Court stated: "This is not a case where the United 
States has merely destroyed property. It is using a part of it for 
the flight of its planes. "148 The Court was careful to narrowly de-
fine those instances where even government "use" of airspace 
would require compensation: "Flights over private land are not a 
taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct 
and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the 
land."I48 Although the Court found that the government "appro-
priation" by "direct invasion" of the claimant's land resulted in a 
"taking" of a severable property right, the finding rested on the 
fact that the government was, in effect, using the land to the ex-
clusion of the property owner's use and enjoyment. 
Thus, the "character" of the act, of itself, will not necessarily 
determine the existence of a "taking." The Court's treatment of 
Causby in Penn Central suggests that the role the government 
plays in the action can be critical to the determination of whether 
or not a "taking" occurs when governmental action is viewed as 
... [d. at 128. 
I •• 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
, •• [d. at 264-265. 
,.7 Since the record was not clear as to whether the easement taken was permanent or 
temporary, the Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Claims for a determination of 
this issue and the amount to be awarded. [d. at 268. The Court had earlier distinguished 
the damages suffered by a property owner under a flight path from those suffered by own-
ers of property adjoining a railroad who are affected by the noise, vibration and smoke 
incidental to the operation of the trains. [d. at 262, citing Richard v. Washington Termi-
nal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) . 
... [d. at 262 n.7. 
I •• [d. at 266. 
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an appropriation of a person's property. Tn addressing Penn Cen-
tral's broad objections to the validity of the Landmark Law, the 
Court rejected the railroad's attempt to analogize the Landmark 
Law to cases such as Causby, where, according to the Court, gov-
ernment acted in an "enterprise capacity" to appropriate part of 
a person's property "for some strictly governmental purpose."150 
The Court stated that the Landmark Law neither exploited Penn 
Central's parcel for city purposes nor facilitated nor arose from 
any entrepeneurial operations of the city. The law was "no more 
an appropriation of property by Government for its own uses" 
than were zoning laws prohibiting two or more adult theatres in a 
specified area for aesthetic reasons or regulations preventing ex-
cavation for safety reasons. 1IH 
Implicit in the Court's decision in Penn Central and in its 
treatment of Causby is the distinction between the governmental 
roles of "adjuster" of the "benefits and burdens of economic life 
to promote the common good"152 and "entrepeneur," where gov-
ernment appropriates property for some strictly governmental 
purpose.1&3 Governmental action characterized as resulting from 
the "adjuster" role is less likely to require compensation than ac-
tion characterized as resulting from the role of "entrepeneur." 
Since almost all legitimate governmental actions can be viewed as 
promoting the public good, this distinction is not clear cut. It has 
been suggested that the distinction lies in whether or not govern-
ment competes with or profits from the regulated activity.lll. Ab-
, •• Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978) . 
... Id. The Court's implicit definition of the "parcel as a whole" in Causby should be 
noted. The Court did look beyond the immediately affected air rights to determine 
whether the impact of the governmental actions amounted to a "taking". Once it had 
found substantial interference with the land use resulting from governmental use of the 
airspace in an enterprise capacity, however, the Court did not consider other reasonable 
uses of the property. Instead, it was content to award compensation based on the diminu-
tion of value of claimant's land because of the government's easement. As the Court has 
often stated that diminution in value alone does not constitute a "taking", Id. at 131, the 
difference here must be the added factor of the governmental action in an enterprise ca-
pacity. Because of the character of this action, Causby is distinguished from those cases, 
such as Goldblatt and Penn Central, where the government's action did not constitute an 
acquisition of property for its own use. Thus, where the cha.racter of governmental action 
is an appropriation of property for its own exclusive use, other reasonably beneficial uses 
of the property are not considered in defining the "parcel as a whole" . 
... Id. at 124. See text at note 143, supra. 
lO' Id. at 135. See text at note 150, supra. 
lO' TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 9 § 2 (Supp. 1979). "[I]n some contexts it 
makes sense to point out that the government is not making a profit from the regulated 
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sent actual competition or profit, it would seem that the govern-
ment's action must result in exclusion of the property owner from 
use and enjoyment of the property in order to constitute a 
"taking". 
The Court in Penn Central also made two statements which 
indicate the range of governmental action that will be permitted 
when the action is characterized as resulting from government's 
role as "adjuster." First, after a discussion of a number of "tak-
ing" cases where governmental action had prohibited certain uses 
of property, the Court stated that these cases illustrated the fal-
lacy of Penn Central's contention that a "taking" must be found 
to have occurred "whenever the land-use restriction may be char-
acterized as imposing a 'servitude' on the claimant's parcel."lllil 
Second, after discussion of still other "taking" cases involving 
prohibited uses of property which the Court observed "were per-
fectly lawful in themselves," the Court stated: 
These cases are better understood as resting not on any supposed 
"noxious" quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground 
that the restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of 
a policy-not unlike historic preservation-expected to produce a 
widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated 
property. us 
In sum, the fact that government's regulation under the police 
power can be characterized as the imposition of a servitude, as an 
adjustment of the benefits and burdens of economic life, or even 
as an appropriation does not in itself make the regulation uncon-
stitutional. This is true even when the action is not taken to pre-
vent a noxious use but rather to implement a policy bringing 
widespread public benefit. In order for there to be a "taking" by 
appropriation, there must be either governmental action in an en-
terprise capacity or governmental action to the exclusion of the 
original property owner, or both. In those cases where these fac-
tors are found, the Court will not apply the "reasonable beneficial 
use" test. Thus, the "appropriation" testl1l7 focuses on the "char-
acter" of the action whereas the "reasonable beneficial use"11l8 
activity". Id. at n.12 . 
... Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 n.27 (1978). 
'" Id. at 134 n.30. 
U7 See text at notes 118-121, supra . 
... See text at notes 115-117, supra. 
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test focuses on the fact that the claimant is able to use the prop-
erty for purposes other than those obviated by the governmental 
action. Each test operates in its own sphere and the use of one 
over the other will depend upon the particular facts of the case. 
In certain fact situations, however, the Court may ignore both 
tests and, instead, focus upon the degree of impact of the govern-
mental action upon the plaintiff's property interests. liB 
C. The "Nature and Extent of the Interference" 
The standard rule relating the extent of the impact of govern-
mental action with the existence of a "taking" is that diminution 
in property value, standing alone, cannot establish a "taking. "110 
Even if the regulation in question prohibits the most potentially 
profitable use of the propertylll or prohibits a beneficial use to 
which the property had been previously devoted and thus causes 
substantial individualized harm,l6I the regulation is not necessa-
rily invalid. However, in some circumstances, the Court has recog-
nized that a statute which "substantially furthers important 
public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations as to amount to a 'taking'."1la 
The leading case for this proposition is Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon. 114 There, the regulation in question prohibited the 
mining of coal in such a way as to cause subsidence of public 
structures, roads or other facilities. The law was passed after 
Pennsylvania Coal Company had conveyed to Mahon surface 
rights to a parcel of land while expressly reserving the right to 
remove all coal beneath the surface. Mahon took the premises 
with all risks and waived all claims for damages that might arise. 
Upon passage of the statute, Mahon brought suit to enjoin the 
coal company from mining. The coal company in defense claimed 
that since providing supports for the overstrata of the coal was 
economically infeasible, the coal which had to remain unmined 
had therefore been "taken" for a public purpose. Pennsylvania, as 
amicus curiae, argued that since the regulation prevented a harm-
ful use of the property, it was a valid exercise of the police power . 
.. 8 See text at notes 111-114, supra. 
I" Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978). 
1'1 See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
I" See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
I'. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). 
I" 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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Realizing the harm that would result if the company's right to 
mine coal became valueless by reason of the restriction on subsur-
face mining, the Court in an opinion by Justice Holmes said: 
"For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to mine 
it." What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exer-
cised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine cer-
tain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes 
as appropriating or destroying it. This we think that we are war-
ranted in assuming that the statute does. 1811 
The statement shows that the Court focused on the fact that the 
company's ability to profit from its mining operation was virtu-
ally destroyed by reason of the statute. Barring extraordinary 
changes in the marketplace, nothing the coal company could do in 
relation to the coal-its only interest in the land-could make its 
mining operations profitable in competition with other coal 
companIes. 
The fact that the coal company expressly reserved coal mining 
rights, while yielding all surface rights, was of particular impor-
tance. Under the circumstances, the Court had no other interests 
in the land to consider. The approach taken in Pennsylvania 
Coal is, in this respect, but a previous application of the principle 
recognized but not applied, for lack of proof, in Goldblatt, that 
governmental action can be so onerous as to amount to a "tak-
ing". Because there were no other reasonable uses for subsurface 
mining rights in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court necessarily had to 
base its determination on the impact of the legislation on the spe-
cific interests affected. In Goldblatt, the Court recognized the 
principle of Pennsylvania Coal,188 but went beyond the specific 
interests in question and based its determination on other as-
sumed uses of the land. 
The Court in Pennsylvania Coal grounded its decision on the 
general principle that when a police power regulation "reaches a 
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an 
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the 
act. "187 Whether this test, focusing strictly on the degree of inter-
ference, with distinct investment-backed expectations188 still has 
... [d. at 414-15 (citations omitted) . 
... Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). 
II. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mabon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) . 
••• The phrase "distinct investment-backed expectations" was not used by the Court in 
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vitality after Penn Central is questionable. In Penn Central the 
Court resolved the "taking" issue by concentrating on the uses of 
the property left to the railroad despite the fact that the denial of 
air rights would cause substantial harm. The Court stated that 
Penn Central's submission that it "may establish a 'taking' sim-
ply by showing that [it has] been denied the ability to exploit a 
property interest that [it] heretofore had believed was available 
for development is quite simply untenable."l69 Just before its 
analysis of Pennsylvania Coal, however, the Court did note that 
if a regulation had an "unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use 
of the property" it might "perhaps" result in a "taking"PO Thus, 
the Court left the door ajar on the question of the Pennsylvania 
Coal test. How far it will open it remains to be seen. 
In sum, the Supreme Court has used three types of tests to de-
termine whether a particular governmental action constitutes a 
"taking." The "reasonable beneficial use" test focuses upon the 
uses of the property retained by the owner after regulation. The 
"appropriation" test focuses upon the fact that the government is 
acting in an enterprise capacity to the exclusion of the property 
owner. Finally, the "distinct investment-backed expectations" 
test focuses on the degree of interference with the claimant's 
property interests. In addition, each of these tests also under-
scores one of the concepts viewed as critical to a "taking" inquiry 
by the Court in Penn Central. The "reasonable beneficial use" 
test emphasizes the fact that in the usual case, the impact of the 
governmental action is to be measured against the claimants' 
"parcel as a whole" and not solely against rights affected by the 
governmental action in question. The "appropriation" test con-
centrates on the "character" of the government's action. The 
"distinct investment-backed expectations" test highlights the 
"nature and extent" of the governmental interference with the 
owner's interests. Examination of the role each of these concepts 
plays in a particular fact situation facilitates the selection of the 
appropriate test to employ in deciding whether a "taking" has 
occurred. 
Pennsylvania Coal but was the characterization given to the Pennsylvania Coal test by 
the Court in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). See 
text at notes 111-114, supra . 
••• [d. at 130. 
170 [d. at 127. 
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v. ApPLICATION OF PENN CENTRAL TO THE AMCHEM LITIGATION 
In deciding whether the 1978 FIFRA mandatory licensing171 
and disclosure172 provisions constitute a "taking" of the plaintiffs' 
trade secret data in Amchem, the district court's choice of which 
"taking" test to apply will depend upon its view of how these pro-
visions affect plaintiffs' uses of the data. It is helpful, then, to 
review the ways in which the plaintiffs do use the data before 
examining the "taking" issue more closely. The words of the 
plaintiffs in Amchem perhaps best relate the uses and the value 
of the data: 
Because they enable plaintiffs to characterize the safety and efficacy 
of their products, and to obtain state, federal and international regis-
trations, these research data are the key to the market, and this is 
reflected in their value. Moreover, this value is substantial. For exam-
ple, a typical plaintiff marketed approximately $70 million of pesti-
cide chemicals in fiscal 1978 alone. . . . Beyond these uses, [the] re-
search data have extraordinary value for product development and 
improvement.178 
Thus, if the data were not required for registration purposes 
under FIFRA, the chemical companies would still have to pro-
duce similar data if they wanted to meet state and foreign regis-
tration requirements. If data were not required for any registra-
tion purposes, it is likely that the companies would still produce 
similar data in order to establish the products' safety and efficacy. 
Indeed, some of the plaintiff companies in Amchem have been 
producing data since 1939,174 eight years before the enactment of 
FIFRA. Without the mandatory licensing and disclosure require-
ments of FIFRA, the companies would be able to maintain the 
value of the competitive advantage derived from the data as long 
as they could keep the data secret. In addition, the chemical com-
panies would be free to sell or license rights to the data to any 
companies wishing to buy. 
As it happens, however, in order to derive any competitive ad-
vantage at all from marketing a pesticide, the pesticide must be 
registered and data submitted. Thus, the data have three sepa-
rate categories of use: research and development, sale or licensing, 
171 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(I)(D) (West Supp. 1979). See note 52, supra . 
... 7 U.S.C.A. § 136h(b)-(d)(l) (West Supp. 1979). See note 57, supra. 
17. Amchem Memo, supra nllte 4, at 10 (footnotes omitted). 
17' [d. at 5. 
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and registration. A company may produce data for anyone of 
these purposes without conflicting with its ability to use it for any 
other purpose. These uses are affected in different ways by the 
fact that under the 1978 FIFRA amendments registration of a 
pesticide is tantamount to removal of any trade secret protection 
insofar as the data are mandatorily licensed or disclosed.l7II 
The lack of trade secret status most heavily damages a pro-
ducer's ability to sell or license the data. A company wishing only 
to register its own product on the basis of another company's data 
would have no reason to purchase or license the data from the 
original producer, except when safety and efficacy data disclosed 
is subject to FIFRA's "exclusive use" provision.176 If, however, the 
company wanted the data for its own internal use, it would have 
free access to the disclosed safety and efficacy data but would 
have to negotiate for any other information not disclosed. As no 
company will pay for data that can be obtained for free, the origi-
nal producer's ability to sell or license the data is, in many cases, 
destroyed. The situation is different with respect to research and 
development, and with respect to registration. The status of trade 
secrecy does help to ensure the profitability or value of these uses, 
but the lack of trade secret status obviates neither the business 
necessity to produce the data nor the ability to use it for these 
purposes. 
The fact that these other uses exist is important in evaluating 
the "taking" claim in Amchem. If, as the plaintiffs maintain,177 
the status of trade secrecy is the only relevant factor to be consid-
ered, it is difficult to refute the proposition that the mandatory 
licensing and disclosure provisions effect a "taking" of that sta-
tus. If, on the other hand, these other uses of the data are consid-
ered, the question would be whether these uses are reasonably 
beneficial.178 It is helpful to view the problem in terms of the 
three concepts presented above.178 
A. The "Parcel as a Whole": Are Other Uses of the Data To 
Be Considered? 
The arguments put forth by the parties in Amchem address 
... See notes 52, 57, supra . 
... 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(I)(D)(i) (West Supp. 1979). See note 52, supra. 
... Amchem Reply Memo, supra note 76, at 50-53 . 
... See text at notes 115-117, supra. 
'71 See text at notes 133-170, supra. 
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this issue indirectly. The plaintiffs maintain that since the gov-
ernment's action represents an impermissible appropriation, 
other uses of the data are irrelevant.18o EPA maintains that, since 
reasonable use of the data remains, there is no "taking. "181 Each 
party assumes that the "parcel as a whole" is as large or as small 
as its theory demands. 
As United States v. Causby 182 demonstrated, the definition of 
the "parcel as a whole" can vary with relation to the character of 
government's action once substantial damage is ascertained. 
Under the interpretation of that case in Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co. v. City of New York,183 the Amchem plaintiffs would 
have to prove that the government was acting in an enterprise 
capacity in appropriating the data.184 If the plaintiffs can do so, 
and since it is possible that substantial damage can be estab-
lished, the district court is likely to consider other uses of the 
data to be irrelevant to the "taking" claim. The "parcel as a 
whole" would be the right to prevent unauthorized use or disclo-
sure of the data and the government would be liable for compen-
sation for having appropriated this right. 
If, under the analysis employed in Pennsylvania Coal v. 
Mahon,18G the district court focuses on the chemical companies' 
investment-backed expectations and finds that the regulation has 
gone too far in diminishing those expectations, a "taking" could 
be found despite the fact that the court considered other uses of 
the data as relevant. The difficulty with applying this analysis to 
Amchem is that, unlike the situation of the coal company in 
Pennsylvania Coal where the only use for the coal was prevented 
by the statute,188 the companies in Amchem have other uses for 
the data not prevented by reason of the licensing and disclosure 
provisions. It would seem that, in this light, the court's treatment 
would depend on just how distinct it thought the plaintiffs' in-
vestment in the trade secrecy of their data was, or on just how 
harsh it considered the impact of the legislation to be on the 
plaintiffs' use of the data. 
'8. Amchem Reply Memo, supra note 76, at 50-53. 
'8' EPA Memo, supra note 86, at 65-68. 
'8' 328 U.S. 256 (1946). See text at notes 143-154, supra . 
.. 3 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
'8' See text notes 143-154, supra. 
"0 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See ~ext at notes 160-170, supra. 
'88 See text notes 165-166, supra. 
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In each of these instances, the definition of the "parcel as a 
whole" would be a function of the district court's focus on either 
the character or the extent of the government's action. If, as in 
Penn Central, the court in Amchem instead finds neither an ap-
propriation nor an unduly harsh interference with expectations, it 
is apparent from Goldblatt and Penn Central that the chemical 
companies face a uphill battle if they attempt to define their 
property interest in the data solely as the right to prevent unau-
thorized use and disclosure. The plaintiffs can neither deny that 
uses of the data exist beyond the property right claimed nor as-
sert that they will be forced out of business by virtue of having 
their trade secrets used and disclosed. They can assert that the 
value of their property has greatly diminished but even that, as 
the Supreme Court noted in Goldblatt,187 is not conclusive of the 
invalidity of the governmental action. 
In Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle,188 the district court took 
an approach similar to that employed in Penn Central in analyz-
ing the property which the Mobay Chemical Company claimed 
had been taken from it under FIFRA without due process of law. 
The case concerned the 1975 amendment to the mandatory li-
censing provision which eliminated both the requirement for com-
pensation and the protection for trade secret data for any data 
submitted before January 1, 1970.188 Mobay claimed that the 
amendment "took" its property for a private purpose and without 
compensation, both in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Noting 
that the objective of the statute was clearly not private gain, the 
court dismissed the first claim. The court resolved the second 
claim by finding that no "taking" had occurred. The court noted 
that the plaintiff produced the data under government regulation 
and that it retained copies for its own use. Since the plaintiff 
could not show that its actual use of the data had been dimin-
ished in any respect, the court could not find that the EPA's use 
of the data to register another company's pesticide, without dis-
closing the data, violated the Fifth Amendment. 190 
'.7 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). See text at notes 129-142, 
supra. 
, •• 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1572 (W.O. Mo. 1978) (opinion of three judge panel), appeal 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 439 U.S. 320 (1979). See note 123, supra. 
, •• 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(I)(O) (1976) (amended 1978). See text at notes 49-52, supra. 
'00 Mobay Chemical Co. v. Costle, 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1572, 1580-81 (W.O. Mo. 
1978), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 439 U.S. 320 (1979). Because of the simi-
larity of issues between this case and the situation in Amchem, the court's words are 
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Whether the FIFRA disclosure provision added in 1978191 
would have made a difference in the court's decision is unclear. In 
a footnote, the court cited with approval two Supreme Court 
cases where laws requiring the labeling of certain products with 
alleged trade secret data were upheld.192 What is pertinent to the 
issue in Amchem is that the district court in Mobay not only con-
sidered all other uses of the data in rendering its decision but also 
found such uses reasonable despite whatever diminution in the 
instructive: 
Under the circumstances presented herein, however, this Court has difficulty ascer-
taining any real deprivation to plaintiff. Plaintiff produces data which it is required to 
produce under government regulation which plaintiff does not contest. Plaintiff volun-
tarily submits that data to the Administrator of the EPA, and it is used by the Admin-
istrator in support of plaintiff's application for a pesticide registration. The data re-
mains in the agency's files, where it is used to support other applications for the same 
or similar products which plaintiff may make in the future. Plaintiff retains a copy of 
its data to use for its own purposes. The data is not transferred by the agency to any 
third parties. 
Plaintiff has neither stated nor shown that its own actual use of its data has been 
diminished in any respect; plaintiff may continue to use its "property" as it has in the 
past. The statute subjects that "property" to no burden, casts no duty or restraint 
upon it, and only in an indirect way, if any, can it be said that its pecuniary value is 
affected by the statute. All other accoutrements of ownership remain with plaintiff. 
Thus, the sole "property interest" which plaintiff claims is diminished by the 1970 
cutoff date of § 3 (c)(I)(D) is an alleged right to exclusively use the data; that is, to 
prevent others from using it. Defendant responds that plaintiff does not possess such a 
right, under the Constitution or the common law. Whether or not plaintiff possesses a 
right to exclusive use of its property within the bundle of rights which make up prop-
erty ownership, this Court finds that the interference of § 3(c)(I)(D) with that alleged 
"right" does not rise to the level of a taking of plaintiff's property. This Court simply 
cannot reasonably conclude that the Administrator's mere consideration of data which 
is required by and which he already possesses pursuant to a lawful regulatory scheme 
in order to determine the registrability of a pesticide product-that is, to assure its 
efficacy and safety prior to its transportation in interstate commerce-without disclos-
ing the contents of that data to any other person and without diminishing in any man-
ner the originator's use of its own data violates the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
[d. at 1579-80 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). 
111 See text at notes 57-61, supra, and note 57, supra. 
I" Mobay Chemical Co. v. Costle, 12 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 1572, 1580 n.20 (W.D. Mo. 
1978), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 439 U.S. 320 (1979). The footnote stated 
that the mandatory licensing provision: 
(D)oes not, of course, require disclosure of any of plaintiff's data to any other parties. 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that a producer's interest in the 
secrecy of its propriety information, even including its secret formula, is subject to the 
right of the state to exercise its police power and to promote fair dealing. Corn Prod-
ucts Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431 (1918); Nat'I. Fertilizer Ass'n v. Bradley, 
301 U.S. 178, 182 (1936). 
[d. See text at notes 202-204, infra. 
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value of the data occurred because of the licensing provision. 
In sum, definition of the "parcel as a whole" of the Amchem 
plaintiffs' data may vary depending upon which aspect of the 
"taking" claim the district court focuses upon. If the court fo-
cuses upon the character of the government action, a "taking" 
may be found despite other uses of the data. If the court consid-
ers that FIFRA has g~ne too far in diminishing the· companies' 
legitimate expectations, it may also find a "taking" on this basis. 
The "parcel as a whole" would be rather narrowly defined in ei-
ther case. However, if the court focuses upon the fact that uses of 
the data exist beyond the status of trade secrecy, the "taking" 
issue would be resolved upon a determination of whether such 
uses were reasonably beneficial. Given that the Supreme Court 
has upheld legislation which effectively diminished a claimant's 
property value by more than 85 percent,193 it is unlikely that the 
ability to use the data for research and development and registra-
tion would be found to be less than a reasonably beneficial use. 
B. The "Character of the Action": Regulation v. 
Appropriation 
The plaintiffs in Amchem claim that because the government's 
action in carrying out the mandatory licensing and disclosure pro-
visions of FIFRA would allow other members of the public to 
benefit from their property, the effect of the 1978 amendments is 
an appropriation of their property, impermissible unless just com-
pensation is made. l84 They distinguish this effect from that of a 
legitimate regulation of property under the police power19& which 
operates by imposing restrictions upon the use an owner may 
make of his or her property, generally to protect public health, 
safety or welfare against offensive use by the owner.1ge Because 
the law is an appropriation according to the plaintiffs, other uses 
of the data should not be considered in any judicial decision. 197 
lIa Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). The property value was estimated to be 
$800,000 before regulation and $60,000 after. [d. at 405. See text at note 140, supra. 
,.. Amchem Reply Memo, supra note 76, at 44-45. 
ItO In amending FIFRA Congress was acting pursuant to its powers under the Com· 
merce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. However, as noted previously, congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause is analagous to the police power of the states and is subject 
directly to the same constitutional limitations applied to the states through the Four· 
teenth Amendment. See text at notes 92-105, supra, and note 104, supra. 
,.. Amchem Reply Memo, supra note 76, at 44-45. 
'07 [d. at 50-53. 
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Under the analysis employed in United States v. Causby,118 such 
a claim could prevail provided the government was acting either 
in an enterprise capacity or to the exclusion of the original prop-
erty owner. 111 Since the chemical companies in Amchem cannot 
show that EPA's licensing or disclosure of the data is to the ex-
clusion of their own ability to use the data, it would seem that the 
companies must show that the government was acting in an en-
terprise capacity. First, however, they must show that the 
mandatory licensing and disclosure provisions do in fact consti-
tute an appropriation of the data. 
The FIFRA sections in question are not worded in terms of re-
strictions.loo Rather, they are mandates for specified uses and dis-
closures of data under certain conditions and with certain limita-
tions. If, however, the statute instead was worded as a restriction 
on the right to keep data secret, the effect would be no different. 
Such semantic niceties are not helpful in resolving the problem.lol 
The real issue is whether laws which may be characterized as ap-
propriations in the sense that they require a data producer to 
make its trade secret data available to the public can be upheld 
as properly within the domain of the police power. Most pertinent 
to the issue in Amchem are two cases where the Supreme Court 
upheld laws which required general disclosure of alleged trade se-
cret data. 
In Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy,IOI the Court upheld a 
Kansas law which required labelling of the percentages of ingredi-
ents of table syrup sold within the state. The ostensible purpose 
of the law was to prevent adulteration and misbranding. There 
was no provision for compensation. The Court rejected the claim 
by the syrup manufacturers that the law deprived them of their 
trade secret property without due process of law because their 
products contained no deleterious or injurious ingredients. The 
Court stated, with reference to a number of earlier cases,I08 that a 
... 328 u.s. 256 (1946). 
'" See text at notes 143-154, supra . 
• oo See notes 52 and 57, supra . 
•• , See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967): "Word play-in short 
dogged adherrence to the constitutional formulas of 'taking' and 'property' -cannot justify 
any sharp line of distinction between government encroachments which take the different 
forms of affirmative occupancy and negative restraint." (footnote omitted). [d. at 1186-87 . 
... 249 U.S. 427 (1919) . 
... [d. at 432. See, e.g., Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912); Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. 
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manufacturer's right to maintain secrecy as to his compounds and 
processes was subject to the police power of the state to require, 
in the promotion of fair dealings, the disclosure of the nature of 
the product. It was "too plain for argument" that a manufacturer 
had no constitutional right to sell goods without giving the pur-
chaser "fair information" as to what was being sold.204 
In 1937, in National Fertilizer Association, Inc. u. Bradley,20IS 
the Court upheld a similar law in South Carolina against a chal-
lenge on due process grounds by fertilizer manufacturers. At issue 
was the so-called "Open Formula" amendment to a pre-existing 
law requiring labels stating certain facts concerning the contents 
of fertilizer containers. The amendment required that fertilizer 
containers sold bear a tag disclosing amounts, analyses and 
sources of specified ingredients. The purpose of the law was to 
inform farmers of the contents so they could better carry out 
their farming.208 The manufacturers claimed that the law was 
neither necessary nor reasonable and thus deprived them of prop-
erty without due process of law. The Court stated simply: "In re-
sponse to the assertion that compliance with the 'Open Formula' 
amendment would require complainants to reveal secret formulas 
and, thus, unlawfully deprive them of property, it is enough to 
refer to Corn Products Refining Company u. Eddy. . . . ''207 
These cases do not settle the "taking" issue in Amchem for a 
number of reasons. First, the claims were based on "due process" 
grounds. Second, neither law required submission of data to the 
government.208 Third, the laws had only prospective effect. The 
v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338 (1907) . 
... Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1919). 
I •• 301 U.S. 178 (1937). 
108 [d. at 182 n.2. The Court, in this footnote, quoted the findings of the lower court as 
to the reasonableness of the type of regulation in question: 
[The laws in question] do most positively tend to meet an actually existing need and to 
serve the purpose which the Legislature clearly had in mind; namely, to so regulate the 
fertilizer business as to give the farmer that information which would tend to aid in the 
carrying on of the major industry of the State of South Carolina. 
[d. (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court, however, did not use the word "regulate" in 
its opinion in either this case or in Corn Products. I.. [d. at 182. 
"" In both Corn Products and National Fertilizer, the plaintiffs were required to reveal 
information which disclosed the identity and percentages of the ingredients of their prod-
ucts. While plaintiffs in Amchem are required to label their products with the name and 
percentage of each active ingredient, 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a (West Supp. 1979), the disclosure 
provision does not authorize disclosure of information which would reveal the identity or 
percentage of any deliberately added inert ingredient. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136h(d)(l) (West Supp. 
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syrup and fertilizer manufacturers could prevent disclosure of 
their data, albeit at the cost of their trade in the respective states, 
by refraining from selling their products in those states. In 
Amchem, the alleged trade secret data may be disclosed whether 
or not the plaintiffs continue to sell pesticides, with the only sure 
way of avoiding disclosure being not to market the products at 
all. The cases do, however, seem to settle any argument the plain-
tiffs in Amchem might make that because the FIFRA provisions 
allow others to benefit from the data, they are necessarily imper-
missible appropriations and outside the police power. 209 
Whether the fact that the data passes through government 
hands before licensing and disclosure is enough to invalidate the 
regulation is another question. However, in Utah Fuel v. Na-
tional Bituminous Coal Commission,210 the Supreme Court sus-
tained the power of Congress to require the submission of de-
tailed business information and to authorize its disclosure to a 
group that included competitors of the submitter. The Court 
there stated: "Obviously publication may be harmful to petition-
ers but as Congress had adequate power to authorize it and has 
used language adequate thereto we can find here no sufficient ba-
sis for an injunction. "211 
The facts in Utah Fuel distinguish it from Amchem in a num-
ber of respects. There was no Fifth Amendment challenge, the 
data were not alleged to be trade secrets, and the disclosure pro-
vision had been enacted before submission of the data. But it is 
the Court's expressed deference to congressional power to require 
submission and release of otherwise confidential information, 
even though such disclosure might prove harmful to the submit-
ting party, that is of interest here. Extending this rationale to the 
situation in Amchem, it is unlikely that the fact that the EPA 
handles the data before disclosure is enough to make the disclo-
1979). See note 57, supra. In the sense that they retain some secrecy over the formula of 
the product, disclosure of the data in Amchem would be less harmful to the plaintiffs than 
the disclosures in either Corn Products or National Fertilizer were to the plaintiffs in 
those cases . 
••• See also Dow Chemical Co. v. Costle, 464 F.Supp. 395 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Mobay 
Chemical Co. v. Costle, 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1572 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (opinion of three 
judge panel), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 439 U.S. 320 (1979) (both cases 
upholding application of 1975 FIFRA mandatory licensing provision). See text at notes 
188-192, supra. 
II. 306 U.S. 56 (1939). 
111 [d. at 61-62. 
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sure provision invalid. 
As for EPA's actual use of the data of one company to register 
another company's product, it would seem that, under Penn Cen-
tral's interpretation of Causbim such action would have to be 
the result of government's action in an enterprise capacity for 
some strictly governmental purpose before it would be considered 
an appropriation of the data. 
As the intentions of Congress in amending FIFRA to protect 
public health, safety and the environment, as well as to promote 
competitionll18 are all within the government's legitimate police 
power, the use of data to further these interests is arguably not 
government use for some strictly governmental purpose. EPA is 
not in competition with any pesticide producer and its use of the 
data is neither profitable nor to the exclusion of the original pro-
ducer. In addition, neither of the two federal district courts which 
have addressed challenges to the 1975 version of the mandatory 
licensing provisionll14 found any irregularity with the EPA's use of 
the data.1Il1 For those reasons, the mandatory licensing and dis-
closure provisions do not affect an impermissible appropriation of 
the Amchem plaintiffs' trade secret data. 
C. The Extent of the Interference: How Is the Loss 
Measured? 
As the Supreme Court has recognized that "taking" jurispru-
dence often involves "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,"1Il8 it is 
appropriate to begin discussion of the extent of a producer's loss 
in the context of the Amchem case by examining the factors 
which combine to increase or decrease such loss. 
Once the data submitted by a producer under FIFRA are made 
available for registration of another product or for general disclo-
sure, the potential market for those wishing to sell such data di-
minishes to the vanishing point. The fair market value of data 
available for such use and disclosure, the usual criteria for estab-
lishing the amount of just compensation, drops to zero.lI17 In addi-
111 See text at notes 150·151, supra. 
III See text at notes 62-69, supra. 
II. See note 209, supra. 
111 See text at notes 188-192, supra, and notes 85 and 190, supra. 
I'. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
117 The fair market value is generally calculated in terms of the highest and most profit-
able use for which the property is suitable. See, e.g., United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & 
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tion, the producing company loses the value of the competitive 
advantage it gained by reason of having exclusive use of the data. 
However, while the fair market value of the data is negligible, and 
the value of the lost competitive advantage great, the producer 
retains all uses of the data it had regardless of the data's trade 
secret status. While, at first glance, the drop in fair market value 
and the loss of competitive advantage may seem staggering com-
pared to the values derived by the producer in using the data for 
other purposes, a number of factors tend to mitigate the actual 
loss suffered by a pesticide producer because of licensing or dis-
closure of its data. 
If a producer did not want to sell or license his data in the first 
place, he of course would not be affected by the decline in fair 
market value. If he did wish to sell or license his data, a producer 
would, under the "exclusive use" provision,218 still have the op-
portunity to sell or license safety and efficacy data submitted af-
ter September 30, 1978 to those companies desirous of using the 
data for registration purposes before the ten-year exclusive-use 
period expired. Similarly, the "exclusive use" provision tends to 
mitigate the competitive harm done to a producer by reason of 
disclosure if he is not willing to sell or license the data. In any 
case, the disclosure provision prohibits EPA from releasing data 
which discloses manufacturing and quality control processes, the 
details of any method used to discover the quantity of any delib-
erately added inert ingredient, or the identity or percentage of 
any deliberately added inert ingredient, unless EPA determines 
that disclosure is necessary to protect against unreasonable risk 
to health or the environment.218 
As for any data submitted after December 31, 1969 the 
mandatory licensing provision of the 1978 FIFRA amendments 
requires that any subsequent applicant seeking to rely on the 
data must submit a specific offer of compensation to the original 
producer before the data may be used by EPA/olio In addition, the 
plaintiffs in Amchem are free to use another producer's data to 
Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396 (1949); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
It has also been said that fair market value is "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a 
willing seller". Almota Farmers' Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 
474 (1973). 
21. See note 52, supra. 
III See note 57, supra. 
II. See note 52, supra. 
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the same extent and under the same conditions that another com-
pany would be able to use their data. Finally, the original appli-
cant enjoys the benefits of being first in the market.221 Its know-
how and customer loyalty, as well as benefits from its already-
established advertising campaign and marketing systems and 
strategies would lessen the impact of a new producer's entrance 
into the market. 
While the appearance of a competitor may lessen the original 
applicant's market share, it can hardly be said to make continued 
production economically infeasible when one considers the suc-
cess of products such as brand name drugs in a marketplace full 
of eager competitors selling the exact same chemical product. 
Given that the data, in some cases at least, are likely to be inde-
pendently generated by others working to develop similar prod-
ucts,222 the advantage conferred by the FIFRA provisions and 
market place conditions make application of the mandatory li-
censing and disclosure provisions considerably less invidious to 
the producer than might appear at first impression. 
Certainly, the actual dollars and cents loss to the data producer 
is considerable. In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that it 
is the loss of the owner, not the gain of the taker that will be 
considered in judging whether a "taking" has occurred.223 But in 
making this judgment, one can look to either what the owner re-
tains after regulation or simply to the quantum of impact upon 
his expectations. In essence, these are the approaches employed 
in Penn Central2U and Pennsylvania Coal2 2r> respectively. In 
I .. In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged the tremendous advantage that can be gained from being first in the market. 
The case concerned Quick Point's attempts to abrogate its royaly agreement with Aronson 
since she had not obtained a patent on the keyholder she had licensed to it. The keyholder 
was ingenious but readily duplicated and the design lost all secrecy upon marketing. The 
Court stated: 
Requiring Quick Point to bear the burden of royalties for the use of the design is no 
more inconsistent with federal patent law than any of the other costs involved in being 
the first to introduce a new product to the market, such as outlays for research and 
development and marketing and promotional expenses. For reasons which Quick 
Point's experience with the Aronson keyholder demonstrate, innovative entrepreneurs 
have usually found such costs to be well worth paying. 
[d. at 263. 
••• The Supreme Court recognized the liklihood of simultaneous discoveries in Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490-91 (1974). 
I •• See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). 
••• See text at notes 125-132, supra . 
••• See text at notes 164-170, supra. 
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some circumstances, the choice of which approach is to be used 
may itself seem an "ad hoc" determination. Leaving aside for the 
moment any question of whether the Pennsylvania Coal test is 
still viable after Penn Central, there is an essential difference be-
tween Amchem and Pennsylvania Coal that arguably tips the 
balance towards use of the Penn Central "reasonable beneficial 
use" test in the Amchem case. 
In Pennsylvania Coal, the coal company had only subsurface 
rights to the land. Prevented from mining coal, it was effectively 
prohibited from all uses of its interest. Assuming that in Amchem 
the plaintiffs' most valuable interest in the data is the status of 
trade secrecy, the plaintiffs still have other uses for the data 
which do not depend upon that status from which they can derive 
profit.226 Moreover, with respect to data which might be licensed 
or disclosed under FIFRA, a producer's ability to profit from such 
data in direct competition with other chemical companies is not 
ended by the existence of the mandatory licensing and disclosure 
provisions. Rather, a producer's ability to profit from its data 
compilations by marketing pesticides is left to market-place 
forces as they are, without extraordinary change. This is unlike 
the situation in Pennsylvania Coal where, because of the law's 
very existence, the coal company's mining operations were ren-
dered commercially impracticable. Thus, if the district court in 
Amchem were to apply the Pennsylvania Coal test and look only 
to the degree of the FIFRA amendments' impact upon the value 
of the data as trade secrets, it would be, because of the data's 
other uses, extending the test beyond the circumstances in which 
it was originated. 
In addition, the FIFRA provisions do confer some benefits 
upon a pesticide producer, such as the ability to use another com-
pany's data for its own purposes. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice 
Holmes was unable to find in the law in question the "average 
reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a justifica-
tion of various laws. "227 Whether he would have found it in the 
FIFRA amendments is at least arguable. 
As to the viability of the Pennsylvania Coal test at all, it bears 
repeating that the Supreme Court in Penn Central was careful to 
rule out any contention based on Pennsylvania Coal that one 
... See text at notes 171-178, supra . 
... Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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could define one's property interest solely in terms of the rights 
affected by governmental action.i28 Far from considering the im-
pact upon investment-backed expectations, it was precisely the 
fact that Penn Central had a "present ability to use the Terminal 
for its intended purpose and in a gainful fashion"229 that formed 
the basis for the Court's opinion in that case. On this basis, it 
would seem that the resolution of the "taking" claim in Amchem 
must depend on a judgment as to whether the plaintiffs' "present 
ability" to use the safety and efficacy data can be exercised in a 
gainful fashion. 
Although the loss suffered by the data producers by virtue of 
the mandatory licensing and disclosure provisions would be great, 
it is unlikely that such loss would destroy their ability to compete 
profitably in the pesticide market place, especially considering 
the limitations upon those provisions and the fact that all produc-
ers would be able to use each others' data on the same basis. The 
district court should therefore find that the extent of interference 
with the plaintiffs' expectations, which are essentially the expec-
tations of profits from their work, does not amount to a "taking." 
Such a finding would be supportable by Supreme Court precedent 
in cases where the diminution of value was severe230 or where the 
claimant was prohibited from carrying on a previously beneficial 
use of the property, such as in Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead.m In addition, the "distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions" test, as employed in Pennsylvania Coal, does not seem to 
fit the situation in Amchem where the plaintiffs have other uses 
for their property which are not precluded by reason of the gov-
ernmental action. Indeed,. under the reasoning employed by the 
Court in Goldblatt,28i it would be assumed that such uses of the 
data were profitable. The Court's treatment of the "distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations" test in Penn Central also seems 
to indicate that this test has fallen into disfavor. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has noted that: 
••• Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 n.27 (1978). See 
text at notes 125-132, supra . 
••• Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978). The 
Court also stated in this footnote that Penn Central may be able to obtain relief if the 
terminal ceased to be "economically viable." Id . 
••• E.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) . 
•• , 369 U.S. 590 (1962) . 
• a. See text at notes 135-142, supra. 
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[A] distinction must be observed between the regulation of an activity 
which may be engaged in as a matter of right and one carried on by 
government sufferance or permission. In the latter case the power to 
exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to condition 
and may justify a degree of regulation not admissible in the former. 2S3 
• 
With this in mind, it is suggested that rather than view the 
mandatory licensing and disclosure provisions as interferences 
with investment-backed expectations, the district court should in-
stead adopt the attitude of the Supreme Court in Day-Bright 
Lighting, Inc. u. Missouri/J.3. where it upheld a law which allowed 
workers to take time off with pay in order to vote. The Court 
observed that "most regulations of business necessarily impose 
financial burdens on the enterprise for which no compensation is 
paid. Those are part of the costs of our civilization."2311 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Originally enacted in 1947 as little more than a labelling law, 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 
was amended in 1972 to regulate the pesticide industry so as to 
ensure safety and environmental quality, to promote competition 
within the industry itself, and to allow public access to informa-
tion upon which the Environmental Protection Agency bases its 
decisions. In 1975 and 1978, amendments to FIFRA reflected 
these concerns by gradually removing the absolute protection for 
all trade secret data submitted to support an application for re-
gistration. As of 1978, pesticide companies submitting data pursu-
ant to FIFRA subjected their data to possible mandatory licens-
ing or disclosure. In order to maintain the confidentiality of their 
data, a number of pesticide producers have challenged the FIFRA 
provisions which allow such use and disclosure. Amchem Prod-
ucts Co. u. Costle is one of the first cases to arise under the 1978 
amendments, and the litigation there reflects a number of the is-
sues disputed in earlier cases with regard to the "taking" of trade 
secret data. 
Assuming a data producer can prove that it has a property in-
terest in preventing unauthorized use or disclosure of its data, it 
.a. Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924) (sustaining a law which required taxicab 
drivers to either obtain insurance or post security bond) . 
... 342 U.S. 421 (1952) . 
• a. [d. at 424. 
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must then demonstrate that its "property" has, in fact, been 
"taken". The Supreme Court has recently set forth three concepts 
of critical importance in making such a "taking" analysis: the 
"parcel as a whole," the "character of the action", and the "na-
ture and extent of the interference". While the "parcel as a 
whole" is often a function of the other two concepts, the Court 
has demonstrated different sensitivities to each of these concepts 
depending upon the factual circumstances of each case. In "tak-
ing" cases concerning land, the Court has employed three differ-
ent approaches, each emphasizing one of the concepts. Under the 
"reasonable beneficial use" test, the Court employs a wide defini-
tion of the "parcel as a whole" and even a severe economic loss 
will not necessarily be seen as a "taking". This is the approach 
employed in zoning law cases and recently adopted for historic 
preservation cases in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York. If the Court instead finds substantial damage resulting 
from government "appropriation" of the property while acting in 
an enterprise capacity or to the exclusion of the original owner, it 
may be content to sever that portion of the property appropri-
ated, if possible, and allow compensation on the basis of the dam-
age done to the available uses of the property. In this second ap-
proach, the other uses of the property are not considered in 
judging whether a "taking" has occurred. Finally, under the anal-
ysis presented in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, if the regula-
tion in question goes "too far" in its interference with distinct 
investment-backed expectations, it may become a "taking" on 
that basis alone. 
An application of these concepts to trade secret data submitted 
under FIFRA highlights the fact that emphasis on anyone of the 
concepts could be decisive of the "taking" issue. The Supreme 
Court decisions in a series of cases challenging disclosure of trade 
secret or confidential data would seem to indicate that the "char-
acter" of the FIFRA disclosure is not impermissible. Similarly, 
the decision of two federal district courts on suits challenging ear-
lier versions of the FIFRA mandatory licensing provisions seem 
to indicate that there is no irregularity with the "character" of 
that provision. 
Thus, the "taking" questions seems to focus on whether the 
Court will consider all of the uses of the data as part of the "par-
cel as a whole" and employ a "reasonable beneficial use" test or, 
instead, consider the impact of the FIFRA amendments in light 
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of Amchem's economic expectations in keeping the data secret. In 
Mobay Chemical Co. v. Costle, a district court panel considered 
all uses of the data in deciding that the 1975 mandatory licensing 
provision did not effect a "taking". In addition, the very fact that 
other uses of the data exist at all differentiates Amchem from the 
situation in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the leading case for the 
"investment-backed expectations" test. There, the coal company 
had no other use for its interest in the land other than that pro-
hibited by the regulation. Thus, it would seem that the "reasona-
ble beneficial use" test is the appropriate test for the Amchem 
court to employ in judging whether trade secret data submitted to 
support registration of pesticides under FIFRA have been uncon-
stitutionally "taken." Presumably, if the court finds that the 
plaintiffs in Amchem can use their data despite the lack of trade 
secrecy status, it will find no "taking." 
